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PRIVATE LAW
PERSONS

Robert A. Pascal*
CAUSES FOR SEPARATION AND DIVORCE'

The opinion in Gilbert v. Hutchinson2 is deserving of note
for its very wholesome attitude toward marriage. Sued for separation from bed and board because of his cruelty, the defendant husband alleged the cruelty of the wife had provoked his
actions and sought the application of the mutual fault doctrine.
The court refused to apply the doctrine because the wife's
actions were attributable to her mental illness. Furthermore, it
seems that the court considered the husband's actions all the
more grave because of his failure to show sufficient "compassion and understanding" for the condition of his wife. 3 Indeed,
compassion and understanding are not only essential ingredients
for a working marriage, but they are part of the "assistance"
each spouse is required to render the other under the terms of
4
Article 119 of the Civil Code.
ALIMONY AND SUPPORT 5

Perhaps the most significant decision of the year on a matter of alimony was that in Elchinger v. Elchinger,6 noted in a
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Three decisions, not discussed herein, merely reviewed lower court findings
of fact regarding alleged acts of adultery: Bassen v. Bassen, 133 So. 2d 908 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; Pardue v. Pardue, 135 So. 2d 116 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961)
and Gilbert v. Hutchinson 135 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
2. 135 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
3. The mutual fault and forbearance rules were involved in three other
cases which need no special comment: Smith v. Smith, 139 So. 2d 813 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1962) ; Seeling v. Seeling, 133 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961),; Magliolo v. Magliolo, 135 So. 2d 616 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
4. The French understand this well. See 1 PLANIOL, CivIL LAW TREATISE
(AN

ENGLISH

TRANSLATION

BY

THE LOUISIANA

STATE LAW

INSTITUTE)

nos.

917, 918 (1959).
5. Decisions on this subject which are consistent with well-understood interpretations of the law and which do not otherwise elicit special discussion are
Shapiro v. Shapiro, 242 La. 903, 139 So. 2d 762 (1962) ; Gilbert v. Hutchinson,
135 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Allen v. Allen, 136 So. 2d 168 (La;
App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Viser v. Viser, 138 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) ;
Laiche v. Laiche, 138 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Calloway v. Calloway,
139 So. 2d 55 (La. ,App. 2d Cir. 1962).
.6. 135 So. 2d 347 .(La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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previous issue of this Review. 7 No more than the situation and
its solution need be mentioned here. Briefly, the question involved was the extent of the parent's obligation to support a
major child. A major son sued his father for alimony in the
amount of $1,750 monthly, he being in need of expensive mental
hospitalization for an indefinite period. The court of appeal allowed alimony in the amount of $450 monthly because the father
was willing to pay it, but refused to award alimony in an amount
to pay which the father "would have to liquidate his business
and place himself in a hopeless financial condition."
Another decision of considerable importance is Romero v.
Leger," in which the court ruled that the husband could not be
obliged to make an advance to the Wife of an amount sufficient
to pay her attorneys' fees in a separation or divorce case. The
majority reasoned that this kind of advance was not provided
for specifically in our legislation, that it might serve to encourage litigation, and further that, the attorneys' fees of the wife
being determinable by the court alone after service rendered and
not by agreement between the wife and her attorneys, it would
be difficult to compute the amount of the advance required.
Judge Tate agreed with the majority's conclusion because of an
ancient Supreme Court decision to the same effect,9 but argued
that the wife's attorneys' fees were part of her "support" for
which the husband must provide by way of alimony pendente
lite, and that, therefore, the ancient decision should be overruled.10
The conclusion in Wilmot v. Wilmot" may be assumed to be
correct, but the facts and the opinion in the case raise some
questions as to the propriety of making unit sum alimony
awards to separated and divorced wives for support of themselves and the children in their custody. Here the divorced wife
had been made such an award and when the child married
7. Note, 22 LA. L. REV. 848 (1962).
8. 133 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
9. Malady v. Judge, 22 La. Ann. 264 (1870).
10. The writer respectfully suggests that Judge Tate should have dissented
rather than concurred. If a judge is honestly of the conviction, as Judge Tate
was here, that the old "precedent" is erroneous in its statement of the law and
that the Supreme Court might very well overrule it, then the party in the right as

the judge sees it is entitled to a decision in his favor. It is not enough that the
aggrieved party might ask for certiorari on the basis of a decision reluctantly
concurring on the basis of precedent. Of course, there is no sense in an appelltte
judge deciding contrary to precedent if he is convinced the Supreme Court will
not overrule that precedent, but this was not Judge Tate's opinion here.
11. 136 So. 2d 806 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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(thereby, presumably, ceasing to be in need) the father sued for
reduction of the unit sum award by an amount corresponding
to what had been included in it for support of the child. He was
granted a reduction, but it was necessary for the court to inquire
into the record to determine how much had been included in the
award for support of the child. Had the original judgment specified the amount awarded for the support of the child, at least
some judicial effort might have been spared. Moreover, it may
be suggested that a clear specification in the original alimony
judgment that the liability of obligor shall cease on the marriage
or majority of the child might eliminate the need for such suits
or rules to reduce or discontinue alimony or support payments.
The child who later arrives at majority or marries may then, if
he is in need, prosecute his own suit for alimony under Article
229 of the Civil Code.
Several cases presented interesting questions of fact or law
on the computation of alimentary and support obligations. One
decision containing language, perhaps dictum, with which the
writer respectfully disagrees is Quistgaard-Petersenv. Quistgaa-rd-Petersen.12 This was an acton, presumably by rule, to reduce alimony payable to a divorced wife for support of children
in her cutsody. The plaintiff husband alleged a "change in the
needs of the minors in that the defendant, the mother of the
children . . . has a large income and is equally responsible for
their support." Whether or not there was a change in the mother's ability to contribute to the support of the children is not
clear from the opinion, but the court did say rather clearly that
an award of alimony previously rendered against the father
would not be reduced merely because the mother's income had
increased. According to the court, only if the children's needs
had lessened, or the father's ability to pay had decreased, could
the award be diminished. In support of this opinion the court
cited Holman v. Holman,' a decision of 1951, which the writer
submits is not authority for that proposition. There the Supreme Court specifically stated it was not considering the question because it found as fact that the mother of the child did not
have sufficient income to contribute more to its support. It is
submitted that the opinion in the instant case should not be considered more than dictum for it does not appear that the court
found as fact that the mother's ability to pay had increased since
12. 135 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
13. 219 La. 138, 62 So. 2d 524 (1951).
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the original award. Speaking of the substance of the matter, it
is true that even though there are several possible alimentary
obligors the court can take into consideration only the ability of
those who are before it in fixing the extent of the obligation. If
the ability of the relatives to contribute is to be considered then
they must be brought before the court. But here, in QuistgaardPetersenv. Quistgaard-Petersen,the other obligor under the law
was before the court. Moreover, under Article 227 of the Civil
Code the husband and wife have reciprocal substantive rights
against each other for the support of the children, they being
presumed to have contracted these obligations by the very fact
of marriage, and the obligation weighs upon each parent according to his or her means. 14 Hence an increase in the mother's ability to support the child should be considered a factor justifying
the re-determination of the extent of the father's liability.
Mention may be made of other decisions in which were raised
questions pertaining to the computation of the amount of alimony due. In McNeiU v. McNeill"' voluntary contributions of
$112 monthly to a retirement fund were considered "a necessary
expense" of the husband and therefore to be deducted from his
monthly salary of $858.33 in computing his "ability to pay."
The wife's assets and income were such in this case that the
court could well conclude her needs were not so great as to compel the husband to abandon or reduce his contributions to the
retirement fund in order to provide her with more money.
Nevertheless, the statement that the husband's contributions to
the retirement fund were "necessary expenses" perhaps goes too
far. Certainly excessive payments should not be permitted to
prejudice dependents in need, and in extreme cases it would be
necessary to recognize that one's present obligations to dependents outweigh the obligor's interest in such things as a retirement fund.
In Wagner v. Wagner 16 the court refused to permit a husband to deduct, from past-due alimony installments, one-half the
rental Value of the house owned in indivision by the husband
and divorced wife and occupied solely by her. The court based
its decision on the ground that one co-owner does not owe the
other rent for an immovable occupied by him alone, and also
14. 1

PLAIOL,

CivIL

LAW TREATISE

(AN

STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 1682, 1683 (1959).
15. 139 So. 2d 583 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
16. 134 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
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25f

observed that at the time the amount of alimony was fixed the
husband had not claimed that the rental value of his interest in
the house should be taken into consideration. The judgment in
this case would seem to be correct, for it should be presumed
that the alimony payable to the wife was computed originally
with due consideration being given to the factor that she would
be allowed to occupy the premises rent free. Certainly this
factor should not be ignored in fixing the amount of alimony
payable, for the husband could demand a partition and thereby
escape the application of the free-occupancy rule applied in favor of co-owners. Besides that, it may very well be argued that
the free-occupancy rule should be considered inapplicable in instances in which, as here, the parties can hardly be expected to
use the property simultaneously; but this is hardly the place to
17
continue this discussion.
Shapiro v. Shapiro' relied on Supreme Court jurisprudence
to decide that the amount of alimony awardable after separation from bed and board should be based on the criteria of Article 148 of the Civil Code and not on those of Article 160. The
opinion, however, by way of dictum, also stated that under the
principle underlying the interpretation of Article 160 of the
Civil Code in Smith v. Smith 9 a wife with $3,000 cash should
be considered with "means" and therefore not entitled to alimony. It may be noted in the same context that the facts in
McNeill v. McNeill,2° a case previously discussed in another connection, showed that the wife owned assets totalling at least
$23,000 and that no question was raised as to her eligibility for
alimony. The interpretation of Article 160 by Smith v. Smith
certainly has proved to be difficult to administer and some attention should be given to changing the formula of Article 160.
Perhaps the total revenues which the wife can reasonably expect from her capital, rather than the capital itself, should be
the consideration.
RIGHTS OF SPOUSES PENDENTE LITE

Seeling v. Seeling2" presented the question whether the hus17. It would be interesting to discover the extent to which the "free occupancy" rule had its origin in a form of co-ownership applicable to situations in
which the several co-owners were expected to be able to share in the use of the
property simultaneously without conflict.
18. 141 So. 2d 448 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
19. 217 La. 646, 47 So. 2d 32 (1950).
20. 130 So. 2d 583 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
21. 139 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
..
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band could sue the wife (here for eviction from his separate immovable) after a separation from bed and board, and the issue
was decided in the affirmative. A statement in the opinion, however, indicates that the wife, who had filed the suit which resulted in their separation,2 2 had at that time asked for and been
denied judicial permission to continue pendente lite to occupy
this same separate immovable of the husband, which had been
the family home and which the husband

-

not the wife -

had

ceased to occupy. It may very well be that the wife was at fault
in the separation, as the court found, but the issue of fault cannot be prejudged in separation and divorce suits, and it does
seem that a spouse occupying the family home, regardless of its
ownership, should not be required to depart from it pendente
lite when the other already has left it of his or her own accord.
There is nothing about this in our legislation and hence the
court's decision cannot be said to be contrary to any specific
provision of law, but certainly it would be well to provide for
it either by appropriate legislation or by judicial action under
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
DISAVOWAL OF PATERNITY

Singley v. Singley23 was the only decision on disavowal of

paternity reported during the period covered by this symposium. 2 4

This case involved no more than a simple application

of Articles 187, 188, and 191 of the Civil Code. The husband of
the mother was declared not to be the father of the child born to
her more than 299 days after a judgment of separation from bed
and board, and simply on his having filed the action of disavowal
at the proper time. This being a case of a child born 300 or
more days after the judgment of separation, it was not even
22. Seeling v. Seeling, 133 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
23. 140 So. 2d 546 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
24. Two other decisions of considerable interest have been reported in the
subsequent period and they will be noted in a coming issue of this Review. Trahan
v. Trahan, 142 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) deals with a child conceived
and born during the voluntary separation of the spouses and registered as that
of a father unknown. Gillies v. Gillies, 144 So. 2d 893 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962)
raises two main issues. The first is whether a child born more than 299 days
after the date of the filing of a divorce suit, but less than 300 days after the final
judgment therein, is born 300 or more days "after the sentence" of a divorce,
especially where the divorce was rendered on the basis of living separate and
apart for two years. The second issue in the Gillies decision is whether "remoteness" of the husband and wife may include remoteness by reason of the antipathy
of the separated spouses to each other. This case has been remanded to the court
of appeal for proceedings consistent with a negative ruling on the first issue and
an affirmative ruling on the second.
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necessary for the husband to prove that he and his wife had not
cohabited thereafter.
ADOPTION

Two adoption cases involved questions concerning the operation of subsequent statutes on earlier adoption acts and proceedings. In Crumpacker v. Spalding,25 Mr. Crumpacker, a widower
with custody in fact of a child not his own, entered into a notarial act with Mr. and Mrs. Spalding under which the latter
purported to adopt the child. This act was not valid under the
adoption legislation then in force for lack of parental signatures.
Two years later, however, the same parties executed another act
under which Mr. Crumpacker adopted the child. Thereafter Section 13 of Act 46 of 1932 ratified all previously executed adoptions which were irregular in that "all necessary parties did not
sign the act of adoption." Apparently relying on Succession of
Gambino," the adoptee claimed the rights of a forced heir of
Mr. and Mrs. Spalding, alleging that the act by which they attempted to adopt him had been ratified by Act 46 of 1932. The
Supreme Court ruled that the 1932 statute did not apply to an
act of adoption disregarded by the parties prior to its passage.
In deciding this case the court relied on the decision in Owles v.
Jackson. 27 The second case on a similar problem was In re Adoption of Gordon.28 There a mother had consented in the proceedings themselves to her child's adoption. At that time a parent
could withdraw his or her consent at any time before the final
decree. Thereafter R.S. 9:432 was amended to provide that the
withdrawal of parental consent once given would not of itself
bar the adoption of the child. The court ruled that the amendment could not be applied to parental consent given before its
passage. The mother's withdrawal of consent before the final
decree therefore made impossible the adoption of the child. The
judgment seems very reasonable, for R.S. 9:432 as amended
did not give a parent who had already given his consent to the
adoption of his child a specific delay in which to withdraw it.
25. 241 La. 1001, 132 So. 2d 875 (1961).
26. 225 La. 674, 73 So. 2d 800 (1954) which decided that a child remained
the forced heir of adoptive parents who had later consented to his adoption by

others.
27. 199 La. 940, 7 So. 2d 192 (1942).
28. 135 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
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Something should be said of a third adoption decision, State
ex rel. Cockerham v. Jordan,29 because it is susceptible of misconstruction on two scores. First, the opinion states that a
mother who has given consent to an adoption may withdraw it
"prior to culmination of proceedings legally effecting such adoption." This statement was correct under the law as it was prior
to the amendment of R.S. 9:432 in 1960, and the facts of the
case had occurred prior to that amendment. The statement
would not be true today, as should be evident from the discussion, in the preceding paragraph, of the case of In re Adoption
of Gordon.0 Secondly, the opinion leaves the impression that a
formal act of surrender for adoption under R.S. 9:401-405 may
be revoked by the parent. This is not so, as is evident from R.S.
9:404, according to which the formal surrender "terminates all
parental rights" of the surrendering parents. The surrender involved in the instant case, however, was not a formal surrender
under R.S. 9:401-405, it having been made to individual wouldbe adoptive parents and not to an agency as defined by R.S.
9:401.
CUSTODY

31

Of special interest among the custody decisions is that of
State v. Knight. 2 The mother brought habeas corpus proceedings to regain custody of her child from foster parents. The district court returned the child to the custody of her mother.
Under the new Code of Civil Procedure, Article 3943, a devolutive, but not a suspensive appeal, may be had in custody cases.
The court then granted suspensory writs "because writs were
the only remedy available to defendants considering Article
3943, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure." The case illustrates
that, although suspensive appeals are not proper in custody
cases, a speedier review than that available through devolutive
appeal is desirable. Perhaps specific amendatory legislation
29.
30.
31.
were:
Hanks,

134 So. 2d 81 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
135 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
Custody decisions applying well-settled principles and not discussed herein
Hartwell v. Hartwell, 136 So. 2d 81 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Hanks v.
138 So. 2d 19 (La. App.

1st Cir. 1962);

Lyckburg v. Lyckburg, 140

So. 2d 487 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Carlson v. Carlson, 140 So. 2d 801 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Tullier v. Tullier, 140 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962);
Smith v. Smith, 141 So. 2d 84 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Bassen v. Bassen, 133
So. 2d 908 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; Gilbert v. Hutchinson, 135 So. 2d 283 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Ballard v. Ballard, 135 So. 2d 322 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961)
Gentry v. Gentry, 136 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
32. 135 So. 2d 126 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
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Would be advisable, but until then the practice here inaugurated
probably will prove satisfactory.
A second issue raised in the Knight case was the admissibility of a report prepared by the Department of Public Welfare
and admitted over the mother's objection. The court relied on
In re Caronna 3 as authority for the admission of such evidence
in custody cases. A similar, though not identical, question was
presented in Smith v. Smith,3 4 a decision of the same court of
appeal. There the question was whether a report in a custody
case by the family court's probation officer was admissible, but
the court was able to avoid the issue because the parties had
stipulated they would consent to the utilization of such a report
by the judge. It would seem to the writer that whereas such
"social reports," as they seem to be called in the decisions, can
be of much aid to the court, the parties who supply the evidence
to the social workers or probation officers should be subject to
oath and cross examination by the interested parties.
The third point of interest in the Knight case is its very clear
statement that the feelings of foster parents must yield to the
natural rights of parents to the custody of their children unless
the latter have forfeited their rights by reason of culpable failure to fulfill their responsibilities to them, or unless the welfare of the children necessarily requires their being placed in
the care of others. The interpretation which the court places on
State ex rel. Paul v. Peniston35 by reading the somewhat extreme
opinion of the majority in the light of Judge (then Justice ad
hoc) Tate's concurring opinion should serve as a useful guide
in future cases of the same kind. In Knight, as mentioned before, the mother was permitted to regain custody of her child.
The decision on this score might be contrasted with that in State
ex rel. Hampton v. McElroy,36 another First Circuit case, in
which a mother who had left her child with its aunt and uncle
for eight years without previous effort to regain its custody
was denied it.
INTERDICTION PROCEDURE

In Interdiction of Polmer37 an interdict petitioned for re33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

197
141
235
141
141

La. 494, 2 So. 2d 1 (1941).
So. 2d 84 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
La. 579, 105 So. 2d 228 (1958).
So. 2d 666 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
So. 2d 696 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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moval of his interdiction. By his answer the curator of the interdict admitted the allegations in the latter's petition and asked
that the interdiction be removed. The undercuratrix then filed
an opposition to the removal of interdiction and this opposition
was dismissed by the district court. Following trial on the
merits and a judgment removing the interdiction the undercuratrix appealed devolutively from the judgment. The court
of appeal ruled that the undercuratrix had the right to intervene in the suit and, further, that she could appeal from the
final judgment in the proceedings even though she had not appealed from the order dismissing her opposition. The court
cited, among others, Article 275 of the Civil Code as establishing the substantive right of the undercuratrix, Article 1091 of
the Code of Civil Procedure as establishing her procedural right
to intervene, and Article 2083 of the same Code as settling her
right to appeal as she did. This last article permits appeals from
interlocutory judgments only when irreparable injury would result, and the court reasoned that irreparable injury could not
result here from the undercuratrix's failure to appeal from the
interlocutory judgment inasmuch as the parties could be placed
in the same position in which they were at the time the opposition was filed. The reasoning appears to be sound.
TORTS OF THE MINOR

Two cases from different appellate circuits considered the
liability of a minor and of his parents for the minor's wrongful
acts. In Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Nunez38 a minor damaged an aircraft rented by him (?) and in Boston Insurance Co.
v. SimoneauxA9 a fifteen-year-old damaged an automobile which
he had washed for compensation and which he was returning
to the owner, though perhaps (and this is not clear from the
opinion) by an unnecessarily long route. In each case the insurer had paid the insured owner and was seeking compensation. In each case the court denied recovery, relying on previous
jurisprudence to the effect that where the wrong of the minor
is also a breach of contract the parent is not liable for the harm
done, the wrong being "inseparably interwoven" with the contract breach, and parents being liable for only the torts, and not
the breaches of contract, by their minor children.
38. 134 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
39. 135 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961)..
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S:It is. submitted that such conclusions are the product of .a
false 'logic. Indeed, there is, first of all, no more reason for saying the: parent is not liable in case the minor's wrong is both,
tortious and in breach of contract than .there is for saying that
he:is liable. Is a harm less a tort because the wrongdoer caused
it -while: under contract - unless the contract absolves him of
liability- or because contract law quite independently of tort.
law would also make him liable for it? Let it be assumed that
the contract is invalid - as the courts said it was in Simoneaux
and may have considered it to be in Nunez- would there not,
be, even under the logic employed by the decisions, even more
reason to recognize the liability in tort?
What has been said above does not deny that in particular
cases liability may not exist because of other reasons. Thus, in
Simoneaux the court found the insured "himself at fault" in allowing the minor to drive his automobile after the minor's
father had told the insured he did not wish his son to do so. So,
too, though this does not appear in the opinion, the insured in
Nunez may have rented the airplane to the minor knowing him,
to be such and not to have the authorization of his father. In
such a -case, perhaps non-liability of the father might be based
on an assumption of risk by the insured. But, regardless of the
merit of such possible defenses, it can hardly be said that one
is not liable in tort simply because he was in contractual relationship with the one wronged.

PROPERTY
Alvin B. Rubin* and Harry R. Sachse**
NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS
State v. Cenac' involved a state claim to ownership of the bed
of a navigable lake which had been patented to the defendants'
author in title. The defense was the six-year liberative prescrip*Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge
Bar. ,
.**Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge
!-,
Bar.,
1. 132 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961), writ refused, 241 La. 1055, 132
So. 2d 928 (1961). Accord, Olin Gas Transmission Corp. v. Harrison, 132 So. 2d
:.
721 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied Nov. 6, 1961.

